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REDUNDANCY PAY AND COLLECTIVE DISMISSALS
Abstract
Redundancy payments for collective dismissals are incorporated into a
Shapiro-Stiglitz model of efficiency wages. It is shown that a fixed payment
will lower wages, leave employment and welfare unaffected if there are no
wage-dependent taxes, no additional firing costs and if unemployment
benefits are not altered by redundancy payments. If payroll taxes exceed
firing costs and unemployment benefits are independent of redundancy pay,
employment and welfare will rise with redundancy payments. If these
payments are also a function of previous wages, positive employment effects
will be mitigated. A substitution of wage-dependent for lump-sum redundancy
payments can lower employment, allowing for a continuous variation of
effort.
JEL Classification: J41, J65.










Payments for dismissed workers are widely observed. About 50% of OECD member states had
legal entitlements to severance pay for individual dismissals in the early 1990s (Lazear 1990,
OECD 1993). Moreover, private or collective agreements can constitute the basis for such
transfers (cf. Pencavel 1991, 63f, Pita 1997, or Booth and McCulloch 1999). Despite this
prevalence of severance pay, the economic analysis has so far focused only on some of their
characteristics. The main features for the purpose of this paper may be summarised as:
1. Payments are often discussed in conjunction with other firing costs and subsumed under the
heading of employment protection measures. Thus, their transfer character becomes intertwined
with the tax nature of other firing costs (Garibaldi and Violante 1999, OECD 1999).
2. In the absence of market imperfections - and sometimes also in their presence - severance
payments have no employment effects (Lazear 1990, Burda 1992, Booth 1997).
3. In general, no distinction is made between awards for individual dismissals - here referred to
as severance payments (SPs) - and compensations for collective dismissals - labelled
redundancy payments (RPs) -, although they can differ substantially (Emerson 1988, OECD
1999).
In this paper, the wage, employment, and welfare effects of payments in the case of collective
dismissals, that is of RPs, are investigated in a dynamic shirking model of efficiency wages.
Lump-sum RPs will leave employment and welfare unaffected if there are no additional wage-
dependent labour or firing costs and if unemployment benefits not altered by dismissal com-
pensation. The intuition for the absence of any employment effect is the following: in a situ-
ation in which a worker can either shirk or bring forward the required amount of effort, s/he
will deliver this level of effort if the utility from doing so is higher than from shirking. The
utility from providing effort includes the utility from becoming unemployed for reasons which
are independent of the effort performance. Since RPs raise the expected utility of a worker who
is dismissed for such exogenous reasons, providing effort becomes more attractive. This allows
firms to reduce the efficiency wage, which will adjust fully to the change in labour costs owing
to RPs if there are no additional wage-related labour costs, such as payroll taxes. In the absence
of additional firing costs, employment remains constant. If there are payroll taxes but no
additional firing costs, while unemployment benefits are unaffected by RPs, employment and
welfare will increase with these payments. The positive employment effect arises as an increase
in RPs and a fall in wages which retains the worker's utility level reduces labour costs owing to
the amplifying effect of the tax. Reducing unemployment benefits for the recipients of RPs can
reverse the employment and welfare consequences of their change since the wage reduction is
mitigated. If RPs are a function of previous wages and the effort function is continuous, a
substitution of wage-related for lump-sum RPs can reduce employment.
Severance payments have implicitly been analysed in an efficiency wage setting by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), since in their model unemployment benefits are equivalent to SPs. Thus, higher3
SPs reduce employment and welfare. Fella (2000), based on Saint-Paul (1995a), assumes that
SPs are never paid in the case of disciplinary dismissals. As these SPs mitigate the incentives to
shirk they increase employment. In a setting with collective negotiations, bargaining about
wages and RPs can result in an efficient contract, that is, bargaining about RPs can be a substi-
tute for negotiations about employment (Booth 1995, 1997, Pita 1997). In a model of search
and matching, SPs can provide a perfect insurance against income risk (Pissarides 2001).
Finally, Saint-Paul (1995b, 2000) incorporates SPs into efficiency wage models to analyse the
political support for their introduction. Given these previous analyses, the present paper makes
three contributions: first, it is shown that SPs for individual and RPs for collective dismissals
can have opposite employment effects. Second, in addition to the transfer and firing tax compo-
nent, two further determinants of the employment effects of RPs are identified: labour taxes
and the impact of RPs on unemployment benefits. Third, the wage-dependency of payments is
shown to affect their employment consequences.
Section 2 outlines the efficiency wage model. It is based on the set-up by Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) and includes unemployment benefits by a government agency and RPs financed by
firms. Section 3 derives the employment and welfare effects of lump-sum RPs. In Section 4,
payments depend on the previous wage. To explore the consequences of wage-dependent RPs,
the model is extended to allow for a continuous effort function. Section 5 summarises.
2. Model
Already in 1975 the European Community enacted a directive which imposed restrictions on
mass redundancies. In its wake, many countries laid down minimum requirements for SPs and
RPs. For the subsequent analysis it is assumed that mass redundancies are well defined and that
their occurrence creates entitlements to RPs. Although in many countries employees are cov-
ered by collective agreements which may restrict the company's behaviour if there are (collec-
tive) dismissals, negotiations about wages and RPs seldom take place simultaneously and
agreements cover only a minority of workers (OECD 1997). Thus, the analysis applies to work-
ers for whom RPs and wages are not fixed at the same time and the level of RPs is exogenous.
2.1 Workers
Workers are infinitely lived, discount future payments with the rate r, r > 0, cannot borrow or
save and are characterised by an instantaneous utility w - e, where w is the wage and e their
disutility level. Effort can either be high and conform to the level required by firms e, e > 0, or
it can be at its minimum level e = 0. Unemployment benefits w are paid to every worker who
loses the job. A job loss can occur for three distinct reasons. Workers might shirk and will be
caught doing so with probability q per unit of time. There might be a 'small' exogenous shock
which induces the firm to dismiss individual workers without incurring the costs of RPs.
Finally, there might be a 'large' exogenous shock which requires the firm to fire a substantial4
fraction of its workers. The probability that a worker loses the job owing to such a mass redun-
dancy which obliges the firm to make RPs is equal to h. The probabilities h and q are
sufficiently small, implying that the time periods under consideration are very short, such that
hq ≈  0.1 Firms are not able to make a credible commitment with respect to dismissal payments.
Since it might be cheaper for firms to make SPs also to shirkers than to engage in costly legal
disputes, and because a company will always have an incentive to claim that a worker has
shirked if it could save SPs by doing so, it is assumed for simplicity, and in line with Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), but unlike Fella (2000) and Goerke (2000), that dismissals for shirking and
owing to a small exogenous shock entitle to the same financial compensation. However, a mass
redundancy can clearly be distinguished from firing an individual worker and the respective
payments to workers who lose their jobs can differ. Since the focus of the paper is on RPs, indi-
vidually dismissed workers are assumed to obtain unemployment benefits only. Moreover, the
probability of a small shock is normalised to zero without loss of generality.
The probability that a worker who has lost the job obtains a new one is denoted by a, the job
acquisition rate. Since all workers provide the required amount of effort in equilibrium, the
expected life time utility of an employed non-shirker (VE,N), an employed shirker (VE,S), and
a worker who has been dismissed individually (VU,D) are defined by:
























The utility stream of an unemployed worker who has lost the job owing to a mass redundancy
(VU,M) resembles the utility of a worker who has been dismissed individually, with the excep-
tion of RPs. A worker who has lost the job owing to a mass redundancy obtains unemployment
benefits w plus payments S per period. With a probability a, the worker finds a new job. Being
employed again implies the termination of unemployment benefit payments. However, this is
not true for RPs. Hence, obtaining a new job raises the (discounted) utility stream by VE,N -
VU,M and the current value of RPs, that is S/r.2 If the receipt of RPs allows for a reduction of
                                                
1 The assumption of a fixed dismissal probability implies that a change in the firm's employment level does not
alter the individual's probability of a job loss. This contrasts with Fella's (2000) hypothesis that greater firm-spe-
cific employment raises this probability. One consequence of the differential assumptions is that hysteresis effects
are feasible in Fella's (2000) model (cf. Saint-Paul 1995), which are of no relevance for the present analysis.
2 To avoid the complication of having to consider intertemporal effort and consumption decisions, Shapiro and
Stiglitz's (1984) presumption that workers cannot save requires the definition of RPs as payments per unit of time.
Instead of including RPs into the definition of the utility stream VU,M from unemployment due to a mass
redundancy, the payments could also be incorporated into VE,N and VE,S. The modification would not alter the
results as the utility differential which determines the choice of effort is unaffected by the alternative approach.5
unemployment benefits by a fraction α  of RPs, 0 ≤  α  ≤  w/S, per period of unemployment, the
asset equation for a worker having experienced a mass redundancy will be:
rVUM wS S a V EN VUM Sr , ()( ,, /) =− + + − + α (4)
Solving for VU,M yields:













Using equations (1) and (5), the expected lifetime utility VU,D of a worker who has lost the job
owing to an individual dismissal can be derived as:
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A worker will not shirk if the utility from doing so is not less than the utility from shirking, that
is if VE,N ≥  VE,S holds. Substituting for VU,D and VU,M in accordance with (3) and (5), and
assuming that the constraint binds, allows for the derivation of the efficiency wage we:
we e
q
rha ewh S −+ + − − + = () % 0( 7 )
Thus, equation (7) yields:
Proposition 1:
In a shirking economy with dichotomous effort decision, redundancy pay lowers wages. The
decrease in wages will be greater if payments are not conditioned on the employment status.
The intuition for this result is that higher payments for workers who have lost their job for
other reasons than shirking increase the utility from selecting the required amount of effort e.
Effectively, payments in the case of collective dismissals allow for a partial distinction between
job losses for other reasons than shirking and owing to insufficient effort since raising S makes
only those workers better off who have not been caught shirking. Hence, higher RPs lower the
wage which is needed to induce the effort level e = e. The wage reduction is more pronounced
the higher the increase in the payoff to workers is which are affected by a mass redundancy.
Since conditioning RPs on the employment status reduces this payoff, the wage reduction will
be larger if not only unemployed workers obtain RPs.
2.2 Firms
The economy consists of a large number of ex-ante identical firms. Their number τ  is fixed.
Consistency with the specification of the workers' maximisation problem requires firms to
choose an employment level which will be too high if a negative shock occurs and too low if a
positive shock to productivity or demand takes place. Such situations can arise, for example, if
firms can vary employment at no costs before the type of shock is revealed, while they incur
firing costs subsequent to the revelation of the shock. Below a kind of reduced-form approach
is pursued since the firm chooses an employment level n optimally prior to the revelation of the6
shock, and will employ Tn > n people if there is a positive shock and Pn < n people if a large
adverse shock occurs. T and P are selected optimally. Shocks last one period and are exoge-
nous. Accordingly, at the beginning of the next period it is again optimal to employ n people.
For simplicity and because the impact of RPs is not affected by this presumption, the costless
adjustment of employment before the beginning of a period takes place by reallocating workers
from firms with excessive employment to those with an insufficient number of workers. Hence,
the dismissal probability h and the job acquisition rate a are unaffected by these adjustments.
At the beginning of a period a firm fixes a wage which determines the level of effort. The wage
is independent of the economic situation (cf. equation (7)). Then the shock occurs and the firm
adjusts employment. Firms discount future payments with the common rate r. Expected profits
are invariant over time and the firm's behaviour can be derived from the maximisation of its
per-period expected profits. Let the probability that a firm experiences a positive shock and that
the output price - or productivity - rises from unity to T, T > 1, and that the firm, therefore,
employs Tn > n workers be given by β , 0 < β  < 1. Alternatively, β  can be interpreted as the
fraction of firms which experiences a positive shock. The probability that employment remains
constant or declines is given by (1 - β ). A mass redundancy is due to an output price P, P < 1,
takes place with probability (1 - β )p, leaves employment at Pn and entitles (1 - P)n workers to
RPs. Redundancies can involve costs in addition to the transfers to former workers, such as for
legal proceedings or procedural requirements (Bentolila and Bertola 1990) or, more generally,
'red tape costs' (Burda 1992). These costs are represented by a mark-up ξ  on RPs, ξ  ≥  0, such
that total firing costs per worker amount to S(1 + ξ )/r. The production function f is strictly
concave in effective employment (f '(en) > 0, f '' < 0), while the capital stock is fixed and its
costs are normalised to zero. Firms pay taxes µ, µ ≥  0, on their payroll. These taxes include all
wage-related employment costs, except wages itself. Denoting the gross efficiency wage by  % we
≡  we(1 + µ), expected profits are:
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The present value S/r of RPs is unaffected by the legal rules governing the relation between
RPs and unemployment benefits. This is because lower unemployment compensation only
reduces government expenditure. In a steady-state, inflows into and outflows from unemploy-
ment are equal. Denoting aggregate employment by N and the fixed labour supply by L, a
steady-state is given by hN = a(L - N) since no worker shirks in equilibrium. The inflows into
unemployment owing to mass redundancies are given by (1 - β )τ np(1 - P) and have to equal the
inflows as defined on the aggregate scale, i.e. hN = (1 - β )pτ n(1 - P). Moreover, outflows due
to employment expansion at the firm level have to equal their aggregate counterparts. Since N
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The firm chooses employment n to maximise profits. This implies:
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The second-order condition π nn < 0 will be warranted if f is strictly concave as assumed above.
3. Redundancy Pay, Employment, and Welfare
Higher RPs reduce the wage which is required to obtain the level of effort e. This wage reduc-
tion increases employment, ceteris paribus. However, RPs raise expected labour costs and,
thus, reduce employment, for a given wage. The first objective of this section is to analyse
which of the two effects dominates. Subsequently, the welfare consequences of RPs are inves-
tigated.
3.1 Employment
The impact of higher RPs on employment can be calculated by totally differentiating equations
(7) and (10) for N = τ n, since all firms are ex-ante identical and employ n workers at the begin-
ning of each period, where a = Nh/(L - N) has been taken into account:
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Given an endogenous job acquisition rate a, the relationship between RPs and employment may
be summarised as:
Proposition 2:
In a shirking economy with dichotomous effort decision, redundancy payments S will not affect
aggregate employment if S is paid unconditionally and if the payroll tax rate and the firing cost
mark-up coincide. If S is paid unconditionally and the payroll tax rate exceeds the firing cost
mark-up, aggregate employment will rise with S.
Redundancy pay is only obtained by workers who have not been caught shirking. Thus, wages
can fall with RPs without reducing effort. Suppose, RPs are paid out unconditionally (α  = 0).
Employment will be unaffected if the payroll tax rate and the firing cost mark-up are the same
(µ = ξ ). This is because the fall in wages exactly compensates the rise in expected RPs in order
to induce workers to bring forward the same level of effort. If the fall in wages is amplified by
the payroll tax to the same extent as the increase in expected RPs is raised by the firing-cost
mark-up, marginal employment costs and, hence, employment will remain constant. If payroll8
taxes exceed firing costs (µ > ξ ), the wage reduction will remain unchanged. However, the
reduction in marginal employment costs owing to the fall in wages is magnified since firms
save not only on wages but also on tax payments. Employment becomes cheaper at the margin
and an increase in RPs raises the number of jobs. Garibaldi and Violante (1999) calculate that
the non-transfer component of firing costs in Italy and the UK is less than 15%. Given non-
wage labour costs which might easily exceed 20% of wage payments,3 this suggests that higher
RPs raise the number of jobs. Their employment effects can, thus, be opposite to those of SPs
for individual dismissals unless shirkers can be excluded from the receipt of SPs. If there are no
payroll taxes or additional firing costs and if the receipt of RPs reduces unemployment benefits,
the wage reduction owing to a rise in S will be mitigated while the cost increase due to higher
RPs remains the same. Employment falls. Firing costs in addition to RPs and reductions of
unemployment benefits, thus, have the same impact: they introduce a wedge between the firm's
payment and the transfer which a worker receives.
3.2 Welfare
The investigation of the welfare impact of RPs concentrates on the case of positive
employment effects, that is a situation with RPs which do not reduce unemployment benefits
and a positive payroll tax rate, while the firing cost mark-up is normalised to zero (α  = 0, µ > ξ
= 0). Let welfare consist of the sum of profits, the workers' utility and government revenues. It
can be shown that the utility of no worker declines while any decrease in government revenues
is exceeded by a rise in profits. Starting with profits, the change in instantaneous expected
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Hence, firms are better off owing to higher RPs. If wages fall and employment rises, the payroll
and government revenues might change in either direction. However, it can be shown that the
increase in profits always exceeds the possible decline in tax receipts (see appendix I).4
Turning to workers, the payoffs of someone who is dismissed (VU,D) or someone who works
at the required level of effort (VE,N) are independent of redundancy pay since the changes in
wages and RPs cancel out. Moreover, the payoff of a worker who has lost the job owing to a
mass redundancy rises, irrespective of whether RPs affect unemployment benefits or not.
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3 See also OECD (1986); table 36 inter alia.
4 If government expenditure were taken into account, the positive welfare effects would become more pronounced
as the positive employment impact of RPs would reduce expenditure for unemployment compensation.9
The above calculations are based on the assumption that the job acquisition rate a is constant.
While this is assumption is adequate for each individual worker, since s/he takes this prob-
ability as given, a rise in employment and a constant probability of dismissal implies a higher
steady-state job acquisition rate, a = hN/(L - N). Since the payoffs of workers increase with a
rise in the job acquisition rate, taking into account the equilibrium repercussions implies that all
workers are better off. Note, moreover, that the above argument assumes that variations in the
job acquisition rate a do not affect the wage. This counterfactual assumption (cf. equation (7))
is permissible since the additional wage change, positive due to the rise in the job acquisition
rate, lowers profits by the same amount as it raises tax revenues and the expected utility of all
workers together. Therefore, the effects of changes in wages due to a variation in the job
acquisition rate a have no impact on aggregate welfare. These considerations yield:
Proposition 3:
Higher redundancy pay will raise welfare in a shirking economy with a dichotomous effort
decision if such payments do not affect unemployment benefits, the payroll tax rate is positive
and the firing cost mark-up is zero.
This result seems to be in contrast with that by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) according to which
welfare maximising unemployment benefits - or SPs - are zero. This is because the primary
effect of higher benefits is to increase the incentive to shirk. If only the payments to people rise
who have lost their job owing to mass redundancies, shirking will become less attractive.5
Before completing this section, an additional question need to be answered, namely, if there
limits to the beneficial employment and welfare effects of RPs? In response it should be noted
that all the derivations have assumed that the utility stream from working VE,N is greater than
the utility from being unemployed. This restriction implies VE,N > VU,M ≥  VU,D. While the
latter inequality is warranted for all non-negative values of S, the former inequality imposes an
upper limit on S. Repeated substitutions in accordance with equations (5) to (7) shows that
VE,N > VU,M holds for a value of S such that:




















If RPs exceed a critical level, workers will have an incentive to remain unemployed and the
beneficial effects only arise for S < Smax.6
                                                
5 Accordingly, SPs from which shirkers can be excluded by assumption also raise welfare (cf. Bull (1985), Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1985) and, in particular, Fella (2000)) because welfare losses are caused by the inability to monitor
workers perfectly. This inability will become less pronounced if SPs are restricted to non-shirkers.
6 The requirement VE,N > VU,M is equivalent to the condition for the efficiency wage we to rise with a higher
probability h of a mass redundancy, that is dwe/dh > 0. This is because the efficiency wage will only increase with
h if a job loss due to a collective dismissal lowers the utility of a worker and VE,N > VU,M holds.10
4. Wage-Dependent Redundancy Payments
In contrast to the assumption of Section 3, RPs in many countries are differentiated according
to age, tenure and wages prior to the job loss (OECD 1999). While age and tenure do not play a
role in the model, a wage-dependency of RPs can be taken into account. Assume, therefore,
that RPs can be decomposed into a lump-sum element G, G ≥  0, and a wage-related part σ w, σ
≥  0, such that % S = S/r = (G + σ w)/r. Since a sufficient condition for employment to increase
with RPs is a payroll tax rate in excess of the firing cost mark-up (µ > ξ ) and the absence of
reductions in unemployment benefits (α  = 0), these restrictions are, henceforth, imposed.
Section 4.1 looks at the impact of a wage-dependency of RPs in the context of the efficiency
wage model of Section 2. Since the efficiency wage is only influenced by the level of RPs, but
not by their structure, Section 4.2 sets up a shirking model with a continuous choice of effort.
In such a model, lump-sum RPs increase employment, while wage-dependent RPs have am-
biguous consequences. A substitution of wage-dependent for lump-sum RPs reduces employ-
ment since the incentives to raise the efficiency wage become more pronounced with wage-
dependent RPs.
4.1 Dichotomous Choice of Effort
In the model of Section 2, introducing wage-dependent RPs implies an efficiency wage we
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Since an increase in the lump-sum element G of RPs reduces wages, which in turn lowers RPs
owing to their wage dependency, the wage reduction is mitigated by a wage-dependent compo-
nent. Nevertheless, higher RPs - be they due to an increase in the lump-sum or the wage-related
part - raise employment. Moreover, the increase in employment owing to a rise in the lump-








2 ) N L ( q
h e L
r





















ξ > µ (16)
From equation (15) it can be noted that a change in the composition of RPs, holding constant
their overall level, does not alter the efficiency wage. Moreover, labour demand is determined
by the level of RPs which is the same by assumption. If neither the wage nor the expected costs
of RPs vary, each firm will demand the same amount of labour and unemployment will be
unaffected by a change in the composition of RPs. The results can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 4:11
If the payroll tax rate exceeds the firing cost mark-up and redundancy payments do not alter
unemployment benefits, a rise either in the lump-sum or the wage-dependent component of
redundancy pay will raise employment in a shirking economy with dichotomous effort
decision. A substitution of one component for the other leaves wages and employment unaf-
fected.
The irrelevance of the composition of RPs is due to the assumption that effort can either be
zero or attain the required level e. In order to induce workers to bring forth the required level
of effort, the expected utility from providing this effort must at least equal the utility from not
doing so. Accordingly, only the level of RPs affects the employment performance of an econ-
omy. However, this irrelevance result does not apply for an economy in which effort can be
varied continuously.
4.2 Continuous Effort Function
Suppose, effort e can be varied continuously in the interval [0, 1]. The probability that a worker
is dismissed because s/he has been detected delivering an insufficient level of effort is denoted
by q(e) and decreasing with effort e at a non-increasing rate, q' < 0, q'' > 0, q''' > 0. A dismissal
for shirking is feasible for any e < 1. Denote by Vt
E the utility stream of an employed worker at
period t. Since the utility stream Vt
UM
+ 1
,  of a worker who has lost the job owing to a mass




,  and RPs (cf. equation (5)), given that RPs do not affect unemployment benefits,
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The worker chooses the optimal level of current effort, given the utility from unemployment
and the wage which is set by the firm. Maximisation of Vt
E with respect to current effort et
yields:
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+ 1 etc. hold. Substitution in equation (18) and omission of the time index gives rise
to:
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For the subsequent analysis it is presumed that the effort level implied by (19) is greater than
zero but less than unity such that the term in curly brackets is positive. The second-order condi-12
tion (ω e > 0) is warranted, given the restriction on q(e). Effort rises with the wage and RPs,
while it declines with a higher utility stream from unemployment. Moreover, eww < 0 holds.7
While the above considerations hold for an individual worker, in an equilibrium the utility
stream from unemployment is determined endogenously. The utility stream from
unemployment due to individual dismissal VU, D consists of unemployment benefits w and
the expected utility gain a(VE - VU, D) from finding a new job. Since all workers shirk, having
become unemployed is no indication of an effort level below average and does not reduce one's
probability of finding a new job. A steady-state requires the inflow into unemployment (q(e) +
h)N to equal the outflow a(L - N). Substituting for VE in accordance with equation (17) and the
constraint implies:
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Moreover, given equilibrium repercussions via VU,D, the change in effort owing to variations
in the exogenous parameters can be derived from equation (19) where VU,D and q(e) + h have
been substituted in accordance with (20), and is determined by:
[] { } 0 w S
~
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To indicate that the variations in effort are calculated for changes which affect the entire econ-
omy, the respective level of effort is denoted by E. The changes in effort owing to a rise in the
wage or the employment level are then determined by Ew = - Ω w/Ω E and EN = - Ω N/Ω E,
where Ω N, Ω w etc. are the partial derivatives of Ω  with respect to employment and wages, that
is, they are calculated for a given level of effort:
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While the sign of Ω E is not certain a priori, since higher effort reduces the utility from unem-
ployment and thereby has a positive impact on effort, an aggregate effort function E which rises
with wages and declines with employment requires Ω E > 0. This sign restriction is assumed to
hold, henceforth. For later use it is helpful to note from equation (21) (see appendix II):
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Without further restrictions, eww < 0 cannot be inferred since the term 1 + hσ /r - ew has a potentially ambiguous
sign. However, as shown below, optimal wage setting implies eww/e < 1. In conjunction with w > e from the
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The analysis of the firm's behaviour is not affected by the modification of the effort function,
with one exception. Since effort is a continuous variable, the firm maximises expected profits
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The second-order conditions will be warranted if f is strictly concave and eww < 0 applies. The
combination of equations (10) and (27) yields a modified Solow-condition (Solow 1979). From
this condition eww/e < 1 can be inferred, such that eww < 0 is warranted at the firm's optimal
choices of wages and employment.
The equilibrium of the efficiency wage economy can be depicted by the firm's first-order condi-
tion with respect to employment and the modified Solow-condition, taking into account that
employment N and the utility stream from unemployment VU, D are determined endogenously.





















The endogenous variables of the system are the wage w and aggregate employment N, the exo-
genous ones are the parameters G and σ  of RPs. For further use note that Ew = ew + Γ , where 
Γ   ≡  ( ∂ e/∂ VU,D)(∂ VU,D/∂ w) < 0, as ∂ e/∂ VU,D < 0 and ω e > 0 from equation (19), and
∂ VU,D/∂ w > 0 from (20). Differentiation with respect to the endogenous variables yields:
Fw f ENEw fe w h r f ENEw =+ + − − − + =+ < $'' $'( ) ( ) / $'' ΓΓ 11 0 µξ σ (30)
FN fE fE N fE N =+ + < $'' ($'' $') 2 0,  (31)
for $'' $' fE N f +  ≥  0.8 Given the restrictions on the q(E), Hw will be positive and HN negative if













() 2 0 (33)
                                                
8 This sign restriction, which is also assumed subsequently and has usually been imposed (cf. Akerlof and Yellen
(1985), Pisauro (1991), and Chang et al. (1999)), holds, for example, for a Cobb-Douglas production function at
the firm-level and implies that employment increases with effort.14
In order to calculate the employment effects of changes in the components of RPs, the impact
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The employment effects of changes in the components of RPs are:
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Since Fw, D ≡  FNHw - HNFw < 0, and Hw > 0, and µ > ξ  by assumption, the effects may be
summarised as:
Proposition 5:
If (a) the payroll tax rate exceeds the firing cost mark-up, (b) redundancy payments do not
affect unemployment benefits, and (c) the effort function is continuous, an increase in lump-
sum redundancy pay will raise employment. Higher wage-dependent redundancy payments
have ambiguous employment effects.
For µ = ξ , there is no employment change due to a variation in RPs, as it is the case for a
dichotomous effort decision. Therefore, irrespective of the composition of RPs, in the present
set-up they will only have employment effects if a wage change has a differential profit effect
than a variation of expected RPs. For µ > 0, it can be derived from the modified Solow-condi-
tion that wages fall more strongly for a given rise in RPs and a given level of aggregate em-
ployment than in the absence of a payroll tax. The combined impact of wages and RPs on effort
or marginal effort will remain the same if RPs are lump-sum transfers. Thus, the more pro-
nounced fall in wages translates into higher labour demand per firm and greater aggregate em-
ployment for µ > ξ . The wage-dependency of RPs does not affect the prediction that higher
lump-sum payments raise employment. However, if RPs are wage-related, marginal effort will15
fall by less with a rise in the wage-dependent component than with the lump-sum part (cf.
equation (26)) as EwG < 0 holds. This is the case because an increase in wage-related RPs also
affects effort via the wage-dependency while this is not the case for lump-sum RPs. If wages
fall by less than for a rise in lump-sum RPs, the positive employment impact might be reversed.
The employment consequences of changes in the lump-sum and the wage-dependent
component of RPs can be combined by substituting the latter for the former, holding constant
the overall level of RPs at the initial wage.
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If (a) the payroll tax rate exceeds the firing cost mark-up, (b) redundancy payments do not
affect unemployment benefits, and (c) the effort function is continuous, a substitution of wage-
dependent redundancy pay for lump-sum payments, holding constant the level at the initial
wage, will reduce employment.
Higher lump-sum RPs can raise employment as they allow firms to reduce wages. However, an
increase in the wage-dependent component of RPs makes a higher wage more attractive for
firms. If the level of RPs is held constant at the initial wage, only the positive wage effect of a
substitution of wage-dependent for lump-sum RPs will remain. This entails less employment
for µ > ξ . Since higher wages drive up RPs, given their wage-dependency, the negative
employment effect will become more pronounced, holding constant the level of RPs and taking
into account the wage change, if a reduction either in the lump-sum or the wage-related
component of RPs actually lowers RPs, once wage adjustments have been incorporated.
5. Summary
In this paper, it has been argued that payments for dismissed workers can have substantially
different consequences, depending on whether they are made for individual or collective
dismissals. Using a dynamic shirking model of efficiency wages with a dichotomous decision
about effort it has been shown that an increase in redundancy payments for workers who loose
their jobs due to collective dismissals reduces wages. This theoretical prediction contrasts with
the result for severance payments for individually dismissed workers unless shirkers can be
excluded from such payments. In the absence of wage-related labour costs on top of wages,
additional firing costs, and restrictions on unemployment benefits owing to the receipt of
redundancy pay, the increase in expected labour costs due to higher redundancy payments in16
the case of mass dismissals is exactly compensated by the reduction in wages. In this special
case, a variation in redundancy pay does not affect employment or welfare. If the payroll tax
rate exceeds the firing cost mark-up, employment and welfare will rise. If unemployment bene-
fits are reduced for the recipients of redundancy pay, the employment effects can be mitigated
or even reversed. Finally, the potentially positive employment effects of higher redundancy pay
will be less pronounced if these payments are an increasing function of wages and a
substitution of wage-dependent for lump-sum payments will reduce employment if effort varies
continuously with the wage.17
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7. Appendix
I: Combining Changes in Profits and Revenues
Denote optimal employment in the presence of payroll taxes, that is the value of n which satis-
fies equation (10) for µ > 0 by nµ ≡  n(µ > 0). Expected profits for µ > 0 can be rewritten as
E(Π (µ > 0)) = E(Π (µ = 0)) - (wenµ)µ, where E(Π (µ = 0)) depicts profits at the employment











































(( ) ) ( ) Π 0




















= µ Π ∂
=
S










)) 0 ( ( E
(I.1)
The expression is square brackets in (I.1) is equal to zero. Since the derivative of E(Π (µ = 0))
with respect to employment is evaluated at nµ, and as payroll taxes reduce the optimal level of
























Thus, the increase in profits - the first term on the left-hand side of (I.2) - exceeds a potential
fall in tax revenues, that is the second term on the left-hand side of (I.2).
II: Comparative Static Effects of Marginal Effort Ew
Marginal effort is given by Ew = - Ω w/Ω E, where the partial derivatives of Ω  are defined in
equations (22) and (24). Differentiation of Ew with respect to the wage w, taking into account
that the effort level E is a function of the wage yields:19
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Eww < 0 will be warranted if more than 50% of the labour force are employed (L < 2N). For
Eww < 0, Hw = - EEww/(Ew)2 > 0 holds. L < 2N also ensures EwN > 0 and, hence, HN < 0.
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The change in marginal effort due to a rise in the lump-sum component of RPs is:
EwG
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(II.3)
Since Ω wG = 0 and Ω EG = Ω Ewh/[(1 + hσ /r)r], and because Ew and EG are related according
to equation (25), (II.3) yields the proportionality between Eww and EwG, as it is captured by
equation (26). Finally, using Ω Eσ  = Ω Ew hw/[(1 + hσ /r)r] and equation (25), the impact of a
rise in the wage-dependent component of RPs on marginal effort is found to be:
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